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Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door 
to the International Court of Justice 
Andrew Strauss* 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2003, I wrote an article for the Environmental Law Reporter surveying 
potential international judicial forums where victims of global warming could bring 
lawsuits! In the ensuing six years, numerous lawsuits have been brought in the 
United States and in other countries,2 and environmentalists can now celebrate 
* Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, Distinguished Professor of Law, Widener Uni-
versity School of Law. I would like to thank Janet Lindenmuth, Gina Serra, Michael Hubbard, and 
Warren Rees for their very valuable research help on this chapter. 
1 Andrew 1. Strauss, The Legal Option: Suing the United States in International Forums for Global 
Warming Emissions, 33 ENVTL. 1. REP. 10,185 (2003). 
2 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at*1 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 23, 2005) (alleging the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Export-Import Bank 
facilitated the financing of projects in developing countries that contributed significantly to global 
warming without following proper procedures, including the production of Environmental Impact 
Statements, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA)); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleging that 
five major American power company emitters of carbon dioxide should be held liable under federal 
and state common law for contributing to the public nuisance of global warming); California v. 
Gen. Motors, No. 3:06 CV-05755 MJJ (2006) (alleging that the six largest automobile manufacturers 
should be held liable to the state of California for global warming-related damages under both the 
federal and state common law of public nuisance); New York v. EPA, No. 06-1148, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 30013 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26,2007) (per curium) (challenging the EPA's refusal to add carbon 
emissions standards to the new power plant source performance standards); Cent. Valley Chrysler-
Jeep v. Witherspoon, 2007 WL 135688 E.D.Cal., 2007. January 16, 2007 (challenging the California 
Air Resources Board's regulations to limit greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles on the basis 
that the regulations are preempted by the Clean Air Act and on other grounds); Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. Norton, N.D. Cal., No. 3:05CV05191 (settled Jan. 2007) (alleging that the Secretary of 
the Interior had not acted within the statutory period to review the petition of the polar bear as an 
endangered species due to global warming); Comer v. Murphy Oil, c.A. No. 1:05-cv-00436-LG-RHW 
(S.D. Miss.) (dismissed) (on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 07-60756) 
(claiming that, because of their contribution to global warming which warms the waters in the Gulf of 
Mexico, insurers, chemical companies, oil companies and coal companies are liable for the increasing 
frequency and severity of Atlantic hurricanes including Hurricane Katrina). For representative cases 
outside of the United States, see German Watch v. Euler Hermes AG, Administrative Court Berlin, Jan. 
10, 2006, lOA 215.04, available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/Germany/de.export.decision.pdf; 
Genesis Power Ltd. v. Franklin Dist. Council, 2005 NZRMA 541 A148/05 (Env't Ct. Auckland); 
Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co Nigeria Ltd., [2oo5J F.H.C. FHCIBICSh53/05 (Nigeria). 
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their first significant victory. In April 2007, based upon its finding that greenhouse 
gases are pollutants under Section 202(a)(1) of the U.S. Clean Air Act, the Supreme 
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA3 held thatthe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases. 
Though we are still in the early days of global warming litigation, these lawsuits are 
having a significant impact on the legal and political climate. In response to a good 
deal of popular4 and academic discussion5 suggesting that those most responsible 
for the global warming problem be held legally accountable, corporations in the 
carbon sector are becoming concerned about the extent of their potential legal 
liability. This concern is one reason they are coming to publicly accept the reality of 
anthropogenic-caused global warming, and the corresponding need for regulation 
of greenhouse gas emissions.6 
Despite the significance of this litigation, however, global warming actions thus far 
have almost all been brought in domestic rather than international forums. The only 
exceptions are a petition by the Inuit to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights,7 and petitions by environmental groups and others to UNESCO's World 
Heritage Committee to include various natural sites as world heritage endangered 
by global warming.s While domestic courts are still far and away the primary formal 
3 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
4 See, e.g., Andrew Simms & Andrew Strauss, America in the Dock: Poor Nations at Risk from Global 
Warming Are Growing Tired of Talking, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22,2002, at 21. Eoin O'Caroll, As Earth 
Warms, Lawsuits Mount, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 22, 2007, at 12; Global Warming: Here Come the 
Lawyers, Bus. WK., Oct. 30,2006, David Lynch, Corporate America Warms to Fight Against Global 
Warming, USA TODAY, June 1,2006, at lB. 
5 See, e.g., JOSEPH SMITH & DAVID SHEARMAN, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION (2006); JUSTIN R. PIDOT, 
GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LITIGATION AND COMMON LEGAL 
ISSUES (2006); RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION, 
DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY (DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW) (2005); Sara Aminzadeh, 
A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo 
L. REv. 231 (2007); Philippe Sands, International Environmental Litigation and Its Future, 32 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1619 (1999); Rebecca Elizabeth Jones, Comment, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law 
Issues in Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the United States in the International Court of/ustice, 14 PAC. RIM L. 
& POL'Y J. 103 (2005); J. Chris Larson, Note, Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the Marshall 
Islands, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 495 (2000); Kevin Healy & Jeffrey Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not lust 
an Issue for Corporate Counsel- It's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89 (2004). 
6 Jeffrey Ball, Electricity Group Backs Emissions Caps, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A1O; Jeffrey Ball, 
Conoco Calls for Emissions Cap - Oil Producer Joins Effort to Shape New U.S. Policy on Greenhouse-
Gas Limits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2007, at A3· 
7 See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations 
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (submitted 
Dec. 7,2005), at 13-20, available at http://www.earthjustice.orgllibrarylreportsIlCC_Human_Rights_ 
Petition. pdf; Letter from the Organization of American States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier regarding 
Petition No. P-1413-05, Nov. 16,2006, available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdflscience/ 
16commissionletter. pdf. 
8 See U.N. Educ. Sci. and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage Comm., Decision 29COM 
7B.a Threats to World Heritage Properties (2005), available at http://whc.unesco.org/download. 
cfm?id_document=5941; U.N. Educ. Sci. and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage Comm., 
Decision 3oCOM 7.1 The Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage Properties (2006), available 
at http://whc.unesco.org/download.cfm?id_document=6728. 
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institutions of dispute resolution in the world, they are in certain ways ill suited 
to address the global nature of the climate change problem.9 For example, in the 
Massachusetts case, the EPA partially based its refusal to regulate carbon emissions 
on the global dimensions of the climate change problem which raise "important 
foreign policy issues" that are "the President's prerogative" to address. 'o Also based 
in part on similar concerns and quoting from that EPA decision, Judge Preska of the 
Southern District of N ew York dismissed a claim that the greenhouse gas emissions 
of the power companies constituted a nuisance." Though both the EPA and Judge 
Preska address the problem from their vantage point as discrete decision makers 
within a domestic forum, the implication of their analysis points to the need for 
global prescriptive and adjudicatory action. 
Within the international realm, the one court of general competence is the World 
Court or the International Court ofJustice (ICn. In terms of status and hold on the 
public imagination, it is the closest institution we have to a high court of the world. 
Initiating a global warming case before that body could, therefore, bring significant 
benefits, but the barriers to initiating such a case are also quite formidable, perhaps 
fatally so. My intention in this chapter is to contribute to the discussion of global 
warming litigation with an exploration of both the benefits of and barriers (primarily 
jurisdictional) to initiating a case. It updates and expands that part of my analysis 
from the 2003 Environmental Law Reporter relating specifically to the IC}. As with 
the 2003 article, this chapter is not meant to be the definitive word on possibilities 
for litigating before the IC}, but rather a contribution to an evolving exploration of 
the issue. Because the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol establish the core of the present global warming 
international legal regime, they both loom large in my analysis. Yet the days of the 
Kyoto Protocol are numbered, and what will come after is now the subject of 
intensive negotiations. To the extent (as is likely) that the post-Kyoto regime draws 
on many of the legal structures and institutional approaches of Kyoto, much of my 
Kyoto specific analysis will continue to be relevant in the post-Kyoto world. 
In Section 1, I continue with a general discussion of the advantages of litigating 
before the IC}. In Section 2, I introduce the countries that could be potential 
applicants and those that could be potential respondents in a global warming suit, and 
I focus on evaluating the possible jurisdictional basis upon which such a suit could 
proceed. I conclude this section with a discussion of other procedural and substantive 
hurdles that would have to be overcome before a case could be decided by the ICJ. 
In Section 3, I then shift to reviewing briefly the nature of the substantive law that 
the ICJ would apply. Finally, I conclude by considering the need to view litigation 
9 For a view critical of the characterization of the climate change problem as of essentially global 
dimension, see Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International": Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory 
Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (2009)' 
10 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 520922, at 52,928 (Sept. 
8, 2003)' 
11 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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the ICJ would likely rule on State responsibility under international law rather 
than corporate responsibility under domestic law, its rulings would carry liability 
implications for corporations. In potential domestic nuisance or negligence cases 
against corporations for causing harm, it is necessary to establish that the defen-
dant corporation's contribution to the global warming problem contravened some 
community-wide standard ofbehavior. '4 A decision by the ICJ could help to establish 
the existence of such standards and perhaps be a guide as to the limits on corporate 
greenhouse gas emissions they require. 
Finally, as will be discussed in Section 2, the mere fact that countries join a climate 
change regime does not ensure compliance with that regime. Moreover, even such 
compliance may not be adequate to meet the whole compliment of their remedial 
obligations under international law. As Section 3 explains, standards derived from 
customary international law and general principles of international law as evidenced 
frequently in judicial and arbitral decisions, solemn declarations, and restatements 
can also effect the ultimate obligation of states to limit their contribution to the 
global warming problem. A ruling by the ICJ can help to put pressure on countries 
to comply with their obligations, and it can help clarify the full extent of these 
obligations. 
2. GETTING INTO THE ICJ 
2.1. Contentious Cases 
2.1.1. Applicants and Respondents 
Only countries can bring suits against other countries before the ICJ.'5 Determining 
which applicant State or States could most effectively bring such a suit would not be 
simple. Almost all of us today are participants in the carbon economy. We are both 
contributors to, as well as victims of, global warming. Having said that, some are 
contributing orders of magnitude more than others to the problem. For example, 
the average citizen in the United States is responsible for emitting over forty times 
more greenhouse gases into the environment than the average citizen of Kiribati. ,6 
And some, in contrast, are bearing the brunt of the effects of global warming and 
will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. The most obvious applicant 
Emissions: The Energy Challenge: Big Oil, Small Step, NY. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at Cl; Steven 
Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Energy Firms Come to Terms with Climate Change, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 
2006, at AI; Daniel B. Wood, On Road to Clean Fuels, Automakers Cover Some Ground, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 1,2006, at 01; Claudia H. Deutsch, Selling Fuel Efficiency the Green Way, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at C7; John O'Dell, So Who's the Greenest of Them All?: Well, It Depends on 
Who You're Talking To: In Any Case, There's Hot Competition Among Car Makers to Lay Claim to 
the Eco·Friendly Crown, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at 1. 
'4 See generally DAN D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 393-403 (2000). 
'5 Statute of the International Court of Justice, effective Oct. 24, 1945, art. 34 (1), 59 Stat. 1031,1060, T.S. 
No. 993. 
16 See World Resources Institute Chart of Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2000, available at 
http://cait.wri.orglcait.php?page=yearly (last visited Apr. 3°,20°7), 
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countries, therefore, are those that have contributed little to the problem and are 
most victimized by it. Low-lying Pacific island countries such as Kiribati whose very 
existence is imperiled by global warming have been most often mentioned.'7 A few 
years ago, the small Pacific island nation of Tuvalu, for example, considered trying 
to bring a claim against the United States before the IC].'8 
Another category of applicant countries that has not been considered are devel-
oped country parties to the Kyoto Protoco}.l9 Specifically identified in Annex 1 to 
the Protocol, these countries bear almost the entire burden for reducing greenhouse 
gases.20 Consistent with the increasingly accepted principle that countries have com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities to remediate environmental problems,2l the 
Protocol puts the onus on them because of the developed world's disproportionate 
wealth and historical contribution to the global warming problem. To the extent, 
therefore, that such developed countries are themselves victims of global warming, 
a potential claim could be explored against fellow developed countries that are 
not bearing their share of the responsibility for the global warming problem, either 
because they do not appear to be on track to meet their emission reduction obliga-
tions, including under the Protocol, or they have not acceded to the Protocol and 
are not otherwise bearing their share of the responsibility for the global warming 
problem. 
Whether either vulnerable developing countries or developed countries that are 
making a serious effort to deal with the global warming problem could successfully 
bring a lawsuit before the IC] presents the threshold question of whether the IC] 
would find it had jurisdiction over the dispute. In accordance with the principle 
of State sovereignty, jurisdiction by the Court must ultimately be based upon State 
'7 Low-lying coastal states such as Bangladesh are also particularly at risk. For a discussion of the 
probable effects of global warming on low-lying coastal island states, see Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(20°7), at 481. For a discussion of the extent to which international law protects vulnerable island states 
from harms caused by global warming, see William C.G. Burns, Potential Implications of Climate 
Change for the Coastal Resources of Pacific Island Developing Countries and Potential Legal and 
Policy Responses, 8(1) HARV. ASIA-PAC. REV. 1-8 (2005). See also Nicholas D. Kristof, Island Nations 
Fear Sea Could Swamp Them, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. I, 1997, at F9. 
18 Koloa Talake, the prime minister who was the driving force behind the lawsuit, lost reelection in 
August 2002, and the subsequent government did not pursue the litigation. See Leslie Allen, Will 
Tuvalu Disappear Beneath the Sea? Global Warming Threatens to Swamp a Small Island Nation, 
SMITHSONIAN, Aug. 1,2004, at 44. 
'9 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), art 3, Dec. 
11,1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998), available at http://unfccc.intlresources/docs/cpmvp/kpeng.html. 
20 [d. 
21 The idea that international agreements should place different burdens on differently situated states 
predates modern international environmental law. The term first appears explicitly in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), see infra note 20, but the concept 
has been integrated into earlier international environmental agreements. For further discussion, see 
Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 276 (2004). For an exploration of the idea applied specifically to climate agreements, see 
Comment, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated Versus Absolute Norms 
of Compliance and Contribution in the Global Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. 
& POL'y 473 (2002). 
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consent, which can be manifest in three ways. The first way would be for disputing 
parties to agree to refer a matter to the Court pursuant to Article 36(1) of its Statute." 
The second way the Court could attain jurisdiction is if under the so-called optional 
clause of the Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, the respondent State has prospectively 
entered a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for the kind 
of dispute being litigated, and the applicant State has allowed in its own declaration 
that, in accordance with the rule of reciprocity, it would itself be subject to the 
Court's jurisdiction were it to be sued in a case of a similar nature.23 Finally, the 
third way that the Court could gain jurisdiction, also pursuant to Article 36(1), is if 
the parties have specifically provided for dispute resolution before the Court in a 
pertinent treaty which is in effect between the parties.24 
2.1.2. Referral to the ICJ by Mutual Agreement 
It is unlikely that a developed country being challenged by either a developing or 
developed country for a claimed failure to deal sufficiently with its emissions of 
greenhouse gases would agree to have that claim adjudicated by the ICJ. The ICI 
has over time heard many cases under the referral by mutual agreement provision 
of Article 36(1).25 However, almost all of them have been in the nature of boundary 
disputes where the disputing parties both desired an independent and authoritative 
resolution of a thorny political problem.26 In the global warming context, it is quite 
unlikely that a targeted State would see itself as having an interest in exposing itself 
to a potentially adverse ICI decision. 
2.1.3. Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional Clause 
The viability, on the other hand, of establishing jurisdiction under Article 36(2) 
would depend upon the coincident existence of applicant and respondent parties 
who had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ over such a dispute. Of 
22 I.C.I. art. 36(1), Stat. 1031,1060, T.S. No. 993. 
23 Id. at art. 36(2). 
24 Id. at art. 36(1). 
25 For some representative cases, see Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K), 1953 I.C·I. 47 (Nov. 17); 
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 I.C.I. 209 (June 20); North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf (F.R.C. v. Den., F.R.C. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.I. 3 (Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Libya v. 
Malta), 1984 I.C.I. 3 (Mar. 21); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C·I· 554 (Dec. 22); Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.I. 351 (Sept. 
11); Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.I. 6 (Feb. 3); Crabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. 
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C·I· 7 (Sept. 25); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C·I· 1045 (Dec. 
13); Pulau Ligitan and Pulua Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.]. 625 (Dec. 17); Frontier Dispute 
(Benin v. Niger), 2005 I.C.]. 90 (July 12); Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and 
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, 2007 I.C.]. (Oct. 8). 
26 For reference to the prevalence of land and sea delimitation cases, see TERRY D. GILL, ROSENNE'S 
THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS (2003). See also Todd 1. Allee & Paul K. Huth, 
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100 AM. 
POL. SCI. REv. 219, 220-21, 229-32 (2006) (discussing the domestic political advantages of referring 
bilateral disputes to the ICn. 
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the category of unambiguously developed countries, only two, the United States and 
Australia, refused timely ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Australia, however, has 
now ratified the Protocol, leaving the United States as the sole remaining holdout. 
And with the Obama administration now in office, the United States is poised to 
playa meaningful role in negotiating the post-Kyoto regime.27 
Among the more economically significant countries that are not party to the 
Kyoto Protocol, Turkey also has neither signed nor ratified the agreement to reduce 
its greenhouse gas emissions. Other countries that are not party to the Kyoto Protocol 
include Mghanistan, Andorra, Brunei, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Somalia, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Zimbabwe. Among the nonmember 
countries, only Somalia has acceded to the compulsory jurisdiction of the IC].28 
Somalia, one of the least developed countries in the world, is in political turmoil 
and is, in any event, a very low emitter of greenhouse gases. Of the countries that have 
acceded to the Kyoto Protocol, the most likely targets of an international liability 
claim would be those whose compliance with that agreement is in question. The 
primary requirement the Protocol imposes is that the developed country members 
(Annex 1 Countries) make reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions during the 
period 2008-2012,29 and that by 2005 they have made demonstrable progress toward 
this commitment.30 In addition, all of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol are also 
parties to the master agreement, the UNFCCC, which requires more broadly in 
Article 4-2(a) that the developed countries take measures to mitigate climate change 
by limiting their anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases)' 
'7 Rudd Takes Australia Inside Kyoto, BBC, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.ukhlhi/asia-
pacific/7124236.stm. 
,8 The United States, the only unambiguously developed country not to have now acceded to the 
Kyoto Protocol, has withdrawn from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. See infra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
'9 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), art. 3, Dec. 
11,1997,27 I.L.M. 32 (1998), available at http://unfccc.intlresource/docslconvkp/kpeng.pdf[hereinafter 
Kyoto Protocol). 
30 Id. at art 3. 
3' United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4-2(a), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
Article 4.2(a) in its entirety reads as follows: 
The developed country and other Parties included in Annex I commit themselves specifically 
as provided for in the following: 
(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures 
on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of green-
house gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These 
policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in 
modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective 
of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the present decade to earlier levels of 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification, and tak.ng into account 
the differences in these Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures and 
resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available 
technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and 
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Among the clearly developed Annex 1 countries that appear most on track to meet 
their 2008-2012 Kyoto reduction commitments are Britain, Sweden, and lcelandY 
Of the three, Britain and Sweden have acceded to the ICJ Article 36 optional clause. 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Norway, Portugal, Spain,33 
Canada,34 and New Zealand35 are among the countries least on track for meeting 
their 2008-2012 Kyoto reduction commitments and are, therefore, arguably not in 
compliance with the Kyoto requirements and, more generally, with Article 4-2(a) 
of the UNFCCC.36 All of these countries except Ireland and Italy have acceded to 
the optional clause of the ICJ. Complicating ICJ jurisdiction over them, however, 
is the fact that the Kyoto Protocol has its own dispute resolution provisions. Article 
19 of the Protocol incorporates by reference mutatis mutandis Article 4 of the 
UNFCCC, which provides first under paragraph 1 that parties can jointly seek 
settlement of their dispute "though negotiation or any other peaceful means of their 
own choice."37 Alternatively, Article 14, Paragraph 2, provides that a complaining 
party can unilaterally refer a UNFCCC or Protocol dispute to the IC} or to binding 
arbitration, providing that each of the parties has entered a prospective declaration 
accepting the respective forum for the type of dispute in question. If there is no 
unilateral referral under Paragraph 2, and if the parties are unable to resolve their 
dispute within twelve months under Paragraph 1, any party to the dispute can submit 
it to conciliation by a commission established pursuant to the UNFCCC.38 
appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objec-
tive. These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties 
and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the 
Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph. Id. 
32 See EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS 
IN EUROPE (2006), available at http://reports.eea.europa.eu/eea_report_2006_9/en/eea_report_9-
2006.pdf. 
33 European Environment Agency, E. U. Must Take Immediate Action on Kyoto Targets (2006), available 
at http://www.eea.europa.eu/pressroom/newsreleases/ghgtrends2006-en. 
34 Ian Austin, Canada Announces Goals for Reducing Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at C7. 
35 NZ Greenhouse Gases Keep Rising, N.Z. PRESS AsS'N, May 4,2007. 
36 Complicating a legal action against Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland italy, Portugal, Spain or 
any of the fifteen European countries that were members of the European Union at the time the 
Kyoto Protocol was negotiated is that pursuant to Article 4 of the Protocol those fifteen countries 
can fulfil their mutual reduction commitments in an aggregate way. The European Environmental 
Agency maintained that as of late 2008 those countries were on track to meeting their collective 
commitments. See European Environmental Agency, EU-15 on Target for Kyoto, Despite Mixed 
Performances (2008), available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/pressroom/newsreleases/eu-15-on-target-
for-kyoto-despite-mixed-performances. Because of Australia's late ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at 
the end of 2007, it only committed to stabilizing greenhouse gases at 108% of 1990 levels by 2012. 
Even meeting this modified target, however, will be difficult. See Rosslyn Beeby, Push for Quicker 
Green Target, CANBERRA TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at A15. Japan's compliance is also questionable, but 
that country is making very significant efforts. See Shigeru Sato and Yuji Okada, Japan Utilities to 
Buy Carbon Credits: Steel Makers Also Push to Cut Greenhouse Gases in Nation, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
Oct. 12, 2007, at 19. Both Australia and Japan have acceded to the optional clause of the IC]. 
37 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 14.1, May 9,1992,1771 U.N.T.S. 
38 Id. at art. 14.6. 
Climate Change Litigation 343 
To date, no country has opted into binding jurisdiction before the ICJ under 
Article 4 and neither arbitration nor conciliation procedures called for by the 
UNFCCC have been established. The failure of countries to enter UNFCCC 
Article 14 declarations granting the IC] jurisdiction over matters specifically under 
the climate change regime should not preclude the Court from adjudicating climate 
change claims pursuant to those countries' general acceptance of IC] Article 36 
optional clause jurisdiction. States only need consent to the jurisdiction of the 
Court once, and disputes over treaty interpretation are among the conflicts that the 
IC] is empowered to adjudicate under Article 36.39 
There is, however, a problem. All of the nine countries that have accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the IC] under Article 36 - except for Denmark, Liecht-
enstein, and Norway - have entered reservations to their acceptances excepting 
disputes which the parties agree to settle by other means of peaceful settlement.4° 
While the system envisioned in Article 4 would seem to constitute other means of 
peaceful settlement, the fact that no party has opted into Article 14 ICJ jurisdiction, 
and that neither the procedures for arbitration nor conciliation called for by Article 
14 have ever been adopted by the parties, could be interpreted to mean there is, in 
fact, no final or implementable agreement providing for an other means of peaceful 
settlement under the parties' reservations.4' 
In addition, arguably the fact that the parties to a dispute had previously opted 
into the optional clause of Article 36 makes settlement by the ICJ an "other peaceful 
means of [the parties'] own choice" under Paragraph 1 of Article 14, and for parties 
to have opted into ICJ jurisdiction under Paragraph 2 would have been redundant. 
It would be harder to make this claim if the mechanisms for arbitration were ever 
to be established and contesting parties were to have declared their acceptance of 
arbitration. Of course, the relatively short twelve-month time period envisioned in 
Paragraph 5 for a party to submit the dispute to conciliation if the parties have not 
been able to "settle their dispute" would not seem to contemplate the more lengthy 
process of the IC]'"p 
39 I.C.J. art. 36(2) (a), Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S. No. 993 
40 For example, the reservation in Austria's declaration reads as follows: "This Declaration does not apply 
to any dispute in respect of which the parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to other 
means of peaceful settlement for its final and binding decision." Arguably neither negotiation under 
Article 14.1 nor conciliation under Article 14.6 would constitute "a final and binding decision." The 
Canadian formulation, on the other hand, reserves from its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, "dis-
putes in regard to which the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method 
of peaceful settlement." For the complete collection of Article 36 declarations accepting the binding 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, see The International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction 
of the Court as Compulsory, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index/php?pl=5&p2=I&p3=3· 
4' Supporting such a restrictive reading of a settlement by other peaceful means reservation as not divesting 
the predecessor court to the ICJ of jurisdiction despite a later dispute resolution agreement between 
the parties, see Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, Judgment, 1939 PCIJ (ser.AlB) No. 77, at 62. 
For further discussion of the meaning of settlement by other peaceful means reservations, see Bernard 
Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT'L 1. 277 (2001). 
42 One additional argument a party attempting to use an other means of peaceful settlement clause 
to divest the ICJ of jurisdiction might make is that Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol constitutes an 
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My general conclusion is that a persuasive case could be made that the IC] could 
assert jurisdiction over disputes under the UNFCCC and the Protocol if they involve 
countries that have opted into the binding jurisdiction of that Court regardless of 
whether they have done so subject to an other means of peaceful settlement provision. 
At the end of the day, however, whether the IC] can assert jurisdiction under the 
UNFCCC and the Protocol may not be relevant to the larger question of whether it 
can assert jurisdiction in a climate change case generally. This is because countries 
attempting to formulate climate change claims so as to achieve maximum impact 
in an IC] proceeding would be unlikely to conceptualize them as solely a question 
of compliance with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol even if they and their 
adversaries were party to these agreements.43 As I discuss in Section 3 of this chapter, 
other norms of international law may also be relevant as well, and to the extent 
that a climate change action is framed as a broader question of State responsibility 
for environmental harm under international law, the dispute resolution provisions 
of specific treaties would most likely not be directly applicable.44 After all, the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol do not definitively settle the question of who 
other means of peaceful settlement. Article 18 directs the parties to "approve appropriate and effective 
procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions 
of [the I protocol." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 18. Unlike the dispute resolution provisions 
of Kyoto Article 19 and UNFCCC Article 14, the parties have taken action to create the compliance 
mechanisms called for by Article 18. Because Article 18 does not provide for parties to resolve disputes 
between each other, however, it can more accurately be characterized as a provision dealing with 
enforcement rather than dispute settlement of the sort envisioned by the declarations. 
43 This is likely as 170 states have now ratified the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol Status 
of Ratification, available at http://unfccc.int/fileslkyoto_protocol/background/status_oCratificationl 
application/pdflkp_ratification.pdf. 
44 The issues involving the relationship between the Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the Kyoto Protocol and other international legal obligations is a complex one involving the relation-
ship between these specific international agreements and more general principles of international law, 
including custornary international law. See generally Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in Inter-
national Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L. 1. 291 (2006). For a discussion of the implications of the relationship 
between treaty law and customary international law in the ICI's assertion of compulsory jurisdiction in 
the Nicaragua case, see Monroe Leigh, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
81 AM. J. INT'L 1. 206 (1987). 
Complicating a cornprehensive determination by the IC] of the extent to which under treaty and 
customary law a state party to the Kyoto Protocol rnay be derelict in its obligation to help remedy 
the global warming problem is that the Kyoto Protocol provides for a variety of financial rnechanisrns 
that states can pay into as an alternative to reducing greenhouse gas ernissions. Under Article 6 of the 
Protocol, countries that fail to meet their domestic emissions reduction commitments may contribute 
financially to the reduction of emissions in other Annex 1 countries, or alternatively, they may buy 
the right to exceed their own emissions quotas in the form of "emissions reductions units" from 
other Annex 1 countries who reduce their own emissions by more than their commitments require. 
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 6. Also under the Clean Development Mechanism of Article 12, 
Annex 1 countries can compensate for exceeding their commitments by funding offsetting projects in 
developing countries. Id. at art. 12. Finally, pursuant to Article 18 of the Protocol, the parties determined 
that countries that fail to comply with the Kyoto Protocol will be assigned an amount from the second 
commitment period of a number of tons equal to 1.3 times the amount in tons of excess emissions. 
Id. at art. 18. It is unclear how the IC] might factor in such a penalty to the overall obligations that a 
country might have under international law. 
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should bear the considerable cost of global warming which will persist even if the 
UNFCCC, and the Kyoto Protocol are fully complied with. 
2.1.4. Jurisdiction by Way of Independent Treaty 
The ICJ can also take jurisdiction under Article 36 if the parties to the litigation 
have agreed to an independent treaty with a dispute resolution clause specifying 
settlement before the ICJ. The difficulty for the purposes of this chapter is to find 
such a clause in a treaty whose subject matter arguably covers global warming. In 
my 2003 Environmental Law Reporter article, I specifically examined ICJ dispute 
resolution clauses in independent treaties that might provide for jurisdiction over 
the United States. Although many countries have entered into treaties with such 
clauses, the United States makes for the most logical focus of this study as it has 
rescinded its acceptance of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction.45 In addition, it continues 
to be the world's largest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases, and during the Bush 
administration it refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
In my research, I found that the United States has entered into many Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) or other similar treaties. These are general 
agreements that provide that parties treat each other's citizens as favorably as they treat 
their own citizens in commercial transactions. Because I thought these agreements 
might contain generally worded obligations in the nature of good faith between 
the parties, I looked into FCN treaties and other similar agreements between the 
United States and coastal and island States46 that provided for dispute resolution 
before the ICJ. Typical of the most relevant language to be found in these treaties 
is the passage from the United States' agreement with Greece: "Each Party shall at 
all times accord equitable treatment to the persons, property, enterprises and other 
interests of nationals and companies of the other Party."47 
Other similarly situated coastal nations with which the United States has 
such agreements containing roughly the equivalent language and binding dispute 
resolution before the ICJ are Thailand,48 the Netherlands,49 Korea,5° Denmark,51 
45 The United States, in response to the ICI's determination to assert jurisdiction over it in the Nicaragua 
case in 1986, withdrew its acceptance of the court's compulsory jurisdiction. Military and Parliamentary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.]. 14 (June 27). 
46 As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, island and coastal States are thought to be particularly vulnerable to 
the ill effects of global warming because of rising sea levels and severe coastal weather. See supra note 
17 and accompanying text. 
47 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of 
Greece, Aug. 3, 1951, U.S.-Greece, art. I, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1835. 
48 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States of America and the Kingdom of 
Thailand, May 29,1966, U.S.-Thai!., art. XIII, para. 2, 19 U.S.T. 5843, 5859. 
49 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mar. 27, 1956, U.S.-Neth., art. XX25, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2083. 
50 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Korea, Nov. 28, 1956, U.S.-S. Korea, art. XXIV, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2227. 
51 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, U.S.-Den., art. XXIV, para. 2, 12 U.S.T. 908, 923. 
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and lrelandY Ethiopia, although no longer a coastal State, in its Treaty of Amity 
and Economic Relations with the United States has particularly promising language: 
"There shall be constant peace and firm and lasting friendship between the United 
States of America and Ethiopia,"53 and "The two High Contracting Parties reiterate 
their intent to further the purposes of the United Nations."54 I could find no such 
treaties containing provisions providing for binding dispute resolution before the 
ICJ with small island nations. 
The previously mentioned treaties attempt generally to prescribe how each party 
within its own country should treat the other country's nationals and their property. 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions arguably harm foreign nationals and their property 
within their own countries. It is, of course, possible to argue something along the lines 
that while the parties may not have specifically contemplated such an application of 
these treaties, to the extent that they are meant to prescribe against harm to foreign 
interests inside American jurisdiction, then certainly they cannot have meant to allow 
a fundamentally more egregious extension of harm by the United States extending 
outside of its own boundaries. 
The ICJ has had the opportunity to rule in a different substantive context on a 
similar attempt to construe a FCN treaty to provide a basis for jurisdiction in the 
preliminary phase of The Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran 
v. United States).55 In that case, Iran petitioned the ICJ to accept jurisdiction over 
a dispute involving the destruction by the U.S. Navy of three Iranian oil complexes 
during the Iran-Iraq War. The basis for Iran's claim that the Court had jurisdiction 
was found in the clause allowing for dispute resolution by the ICJ under the United 
States/Iran FCN treaty, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular 
Rights. 56 Iran argued that several general treaty provisions of the sort that I have 
identified were violated by the United States military action. The Court, in finding 
that it had jurisdiction, accepted the position that the FCN treaty had extraterritorial 
application. For example, the Court construed the requirement that a Party accord 
the other Party's nationals fair and equitable treatment as not applying solely within 
its territory. The decision is, however, somewhat more qualified in its acceptance of 
the sort of broad interpretation oflanguage that would be helpful in a global warming 
case. 57 For example, it read the requirement of fair and equitable treatment as not 
including the protection of a party's nationals from military actions by the other 
party. The Court, on the other hand, decided that military activities which destroy 
52 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Ireland, 
Jan. 21, 1950, U.S.-Ir., art. XXIII, 1 U.S.T. 785, 795. 
53 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States of America and Ethiopia, Sept. 
7,1951, U.S.-Eth., art VIII, para. 1,4 U.S.T. 2134, 2141. 
54 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States of America and Ethiopia, Sept. 
7, 1951, U.S.-Eth., art. I, para. 2, 4 U.S.T. 2134, 2136. 
55 Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803. 
56 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, 
9°1. 
57 Concerning Oil Platfonns, 1996 I.C.J. at 81+ 
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or impede the transportation or storage of exports implicate the treaty's requirement 
that the parties uphold freedom of commerce between their territories. 58 This raises 
the question of whether such general language could be violated to the extent that 
a country's contribution to global warming can be shown to affect negatively an 
FCN treaty partner's ability to engage in commerce (say by indirectly damaging its 
economy or directly flooding a port city). 
Similarly, in the Nicaragua case against the United States, referred to earlier, the 
Court also accepted jurisdiction based in part on a binding ICJ dispute resolution 
provision in an FCN treaty in force between the parties. 59 In that case, as in the Iran 
case, military activities arguably more directly impacted upon specific provisions of 
the treaty than would global warming. Ultimately, then, the jurisdictional question in 
applying FCN treaties to global warming cases would be whether treaties negotiated 
in the context of protecting the mutual commercial interests of countries' citizens 
can be construed to protect them from harm caused by global warming. The Oil 
Platforms and Nicaragua cases give reason to believe that such a construction by the 
ICJ is possible. 
2.1.5. Other Procedural and Substantive Issues 
In addition to jurisdictional issues, there are other very significant procedural hurdles 
in contentious (nonadvisory) cases that would have to be overcome before a global 
warming suit could proceed to the merits of the case. Most significant would be the 
issue of standing, whether applicants have a sufficiently individualizable interest in 
litigation as to be able to bring the suit. Alternatively, it could be demonstrated that 
countries' obligations not to cause serious harm through the emissions of greenhouse 
gases is an obligation erga omnes (i.e., that such obligation is sufficiently important 
that all States have a legal interest in its enforcement). 
Assuming that a tribunal in a global warming lawsuit would accept the scientific 
consensus that human-created greenhouse gases are a major contributor to global 
warming, other significant proof problems would remain in bringing such a suit. 
A connection would need to be drawn between global warming and specific envi-
ronmental effects.60 In addition, both assessing prospective damages from global 
warming and apportioning the extent to which they are attributable to any specific 
58 Concerning Oil Platfonns, 1996 I.C.J. at 81<r-20. 
59 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, u6, 136. 
60 As the science of global warming rapidly develops, such connections are becoming easier to establish 
with reasonable scientific certainty. The highly credible United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, for example, concluded with "very high confidence" in its 4th Assessment Report 
that there is warming of lakes and rivers in many regions with effects on water quality and that global 
warming is causing earlier timing of spring events such as leaf-unfolding, bird migration and egg-laying 
and poleward shifts in ranges on plant and animal species. It additionally concluded with "high con-
fidence" that changes in snow, ice, and frozen ground are increasing ground instability in permafrost 
regions and rock avalanches in mountain regions and that rising ocean and fresh water temperatures 
are causing changes in the ice cover, salinity, oxygen levels, and circulation including changes in 
algal, plankton, and fish abundance in high altitude oceans. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
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country would be challenging and perhaps could render a case infeasible. The law 
in this area is not unique to global warming,61 and it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to specifically review it. I only note these considerations here as factors to 
which careful consideration would have to be given in conceiving a contentious 
global warming case before the International Court ofJustice. 
2.2. Advisory Opinions 
There is another possible avenue that would facilitate an IC] decision on the legal 
responsibility of countries to participate meaningfully in the remediation of the 
global warming problem, but that does not require that the Court have the ability 
to assert jurisdiction over any specific countries. Pursuant to Article 65 of the ICI's 
Statute, the Court is empowered "to give an advisory opinion on any legal question 
at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations [U.N.] to make such a request."62 Article 96 of the 
Charter of the U.N. provides that "[t]he General Assembly or the Security Council 
may request the [ICn to give an advisory opinion on any legal question,"63 and that 
"[o]ther organs of the [U.N.] and specialized agencies, which may at any time be 
so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the 
Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities."64 
Pursuing an advisory opinion was the path followed by the civil society-led ini-
tiative to get the ICJ to rule on the legality of nuclear weapons in the 1990S. In that 
case, both the General Assembly as well as the World Health Organization (WHO) 
requested an advisory opinion.65 The Court recognized that the General Assembly 
Change (IPCC), Working Group II, Climate Change 2001' IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABIL-
ITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1-3 (2007), available at http;//www.ipc.ch (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). 
In addition, courts themselves seem increasingly receptive of such conclusions. In determining 
that the state of Massachusetts claimed sufficient injury for standing to bring suit in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that; 
The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized. Indeed, the 
[National Research Council Report] itself - which EPA regards as an "objective and inde-
pendent assessment of the relevant science," identifies a number of environmental changes 
that have already inflicted significant harms, including "the global retreat of mountain glaciers, 
reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers and lakes [and] the acceler-
ated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th century relative to the past few thousand years ... " 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,521 (Apr. 2, 2007) (citations omitted). 
61 See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (where two hunters negligently fired their shotguns 
in the direction of the plaintiff on a hunting trip, the burden of proof is on the defendant to absolve 
herself ofliability); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (where almost 200 manufacturers 
produced DES, a toxic compound that caused the plaintiffs' cancer, the court held each defendant 
liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of the market). 
62 I.C.]., art. 65, 59 Stat. 1031, 1063, T.S. No. 993. 
63 Charter of the United Nations, effective Oct. 24, 1945, art. 96(1), 59 Stat. 1031,1052, T.S. No. 993. 
64 Id. at art. 96(2). 
65 The WHO was authorized by the General Assembly to request advisory opinion from the ICJ pursuant 
to the agreement governing its relationship to the United Nations. See Agreement Between the United 
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could request an advisory judgment in the matter, but it ruled against the WHO.66 
It explained that the WHO was authorized to "deal with the effects on health of 
the use of Nuclear Weapons, or of any hazardous activity, and to take preventative 
measures aimed at protecting the health of populations in the event of such weapons 
being used or such activities engaged in."67 The Court concluded, however, that, 
"[w]hatever those effects might be, the competence of the WHO to deal with them 
is not dependent on the legality of the acts that caused them."68 
The Court is not technically bound by prior decisions,69 but as a practical matter, 
it does tend to follow them, and the global warming case would seem to be very 
similar. Perhaps it could be distinguished because of the WHO's need to be involved 
in ongoing strategies for adapting to global warming as it relates to public health. 
Given global warming's likely effect on agriculture, the other potential candidate 
to request an advisory opinion would be the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) in Rome,7° but it would likely face the same problem as the WHO. 
The Security Council, especially given the ability of anyone of its permanent five 
members to cast a veto, would not be likely to authorize a request for an advisory 
opinion. The General Assembly would seem to be more promising. Pursuant to 
Article 18 of the U.N. Charter, "important" questions require a two-third's majority 
of the General Assembly)' The IC], however, agreed to render an opinion in the 
nuclear weapons case with only a majority (of less than two thirds) voting in favor. 
Even this lower threshold could, however, be difficult to achieve. Unlike the nuclear 
weapons case where only a handful of countries actually had nuclear weapons, many 
countries are significant emitters of greenhouse gases. Depending on how narrowly 
the question presented to the ICJ could be framed, these countries might well be 
reluctant to charge the ICJ with coming to a determination that could implicate the 
legality of their own emissions. 
One disadvantage of the advisory approach is that in terms of publicity value 
(which is helpful for achieving the benefits I refer to in Section 1 of this chapter) 
identifiable applicants and respondents in contentious cases might better capture 
the public imagination than would a simple statement of the law in an advisory 
case. Recommending the advisory approach, however, is its simplicity. It requires 
no imaginative theories of jurisdiction, and it avoids singling out countries simply 
Nations and the World Health Organization, adopted by the First World Health Assembly, 10 JuI. 
1948, art. X. 
66 Legality on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (United Nations), 1996 I.C.J. 226, 235. 
67 ld. 
68 ld. 
69 I.C.J., art. 59, 59 Stat. 1031, 1063, T.S. No. 993· 
70 The FAO has also been authorized by the General Assembly to request advisory opinions from the 
ICJ pursuantto the FAO's agreement governing its relationship to the United Nations. See Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. Feb. 
'947, art. IX. Para. 2. 
7' Charter of the United Nations, art. 18, para. 3, provides that "[dlecisions on other questions ... shaH 
be made by a majority of the members present and voting." ld. 
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because they are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Ultimately, it has the 
advantage of articulating a clear legal standard equally applicable to all states. 
3. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE LAW THE ICJ WOULD APPLY 
With the exception of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, the international com-
munity has not developed specific treaties to deal explicitly with the normative 
dimensions of the global warming problem. Asked to decide comprehensively upon 
the responsibility of States to ameliorate global warming, the Court would also look 
to other international treaties of a more general nature, customary norms of inter-
national law, and general principles of internationallawY To help ascertain the 
content of the relevant principles of customary international law and general princi-
ples oflaw, the IC] would refer to such secondary materials as general restatements 
and codifications of the law as well as nonbinding judicial precedents from various 
tribunals. It would also look to multilateral declarations of States.73 It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to review specific conceptions of how these sources and 
materials interact to create a coherent body of international law or to construct a 
theory of state responsibility for global warming emissions. What follows, rather, is 
an overview of the basic building blocks for the construction of such a theory. 
p. General Restatements and Codifications of the Law 
Because much of international law is derived from customary international law 
and general principles of law, the norms as they develop in the messy world of 
politics and statecraft often lack the clear precision of treaties or domestic statutes. 
For this reason, those working within the international system rely relatively heavily 
on various restatements and codifications of the law that attempt to give clarity to 
areas where international law is amorphous. Of particular relevance to ascertaining 
the responsibility of States for global warming is the law on State responsibility 
for transboundary harm and transboundary pollution in general. Arguably global 
warming, which is caused by gases released mostly within the various countries 
causing the whole of the planetary climate system to warm, is not exactly the same 
as pollutants released in one country causing direct transboundary harm in another. 
The central legal principles that are pertinent to State responsibility for causing 
environmental harm outside their own borders are relevant, however, to considering 
the problem of global warming. 
Ultimately, the principle behind holding countries liable for transboundary pollu-
tion is drawn from one of the most basic precepts of all legal systems that legal actors 
should be responsible for the harm that they do to others. Several expert bodies,74 
72 I.e.J., art. 38, 59 Stat. 103', 1063, T.S. No. 993. 
73 Id. 
74 The views of these bodies on international law generally tend to be fairly subjective, and the relative 
weight which a court should accord the opinions of these bodies when they differ is not well defined. 
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official and unofficial, have proclaimed their own international environmental law 
variations on this precept. 
One relevant pronouncement comes from the American Law Institute (ALI) in 
its Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The ALI 
is composed of eminent lawyers, judges, and law professors in the United States, and 
its restatements are considered by courts and legal professionals within the United 
States to be the most authoritative unofficial reporters of the applicable law in areas 
where clear statutory guidance tends to be lacking. The relevant provisions from 
Section 601, State Obligations with Respect to Environment of Other States and the 
Common Environment, are potentially helpful in the context of climate change. 
They assert that: 
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent 
practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its juris-
diction or control 
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the pre-
vention, reduction and control of injury to the environment of another state 
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and 
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of 
another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.75 
A frequently cited similar, although arguably slightly stronger, statement of the 
law can be found in Article 3 of the International Law Association's Rules on 
International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution.76 The International Law 
Association is a private expert body. 
The most authoritative international body of expert reporters is the U.N.'s Inter-
national Law Commission. Established by the General Assembly pursuant to the 
U.N. Charter, the members of the Commission, international lawyers who serve in 
their individual capacities, attempt to both codify and "progressively develop" inter-
national law. Some of the International Law Commission's works are adopted by the 
General Assembly as declarations and some eventually become treaties. Over many 
years, the International Law Commission has been heavily involved in attempt-
ing to define the law of State responsibility. Probably most relevant is its work on 
recently adopted International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of 
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Damage 
from Hazardous Activities), which according to its terms applies "to activities not pro-
hibited by international law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary 
harm through their physical consequences."77 Its language requires States to "take 
appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to 
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 601(1) (1986). 
76 Montreal Rules ofInternational Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, art. 3(1), Int'l Law Assn., 
Rep. 60th ConE., at 1-3 (1982). 
77 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Trans boundary Damage from Hazardous Activities, International 
Law Commission, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, ch. y.E. 1, art. I, U.N. Doc. N56ho (2001). 
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minimize the risk thereof' and to "cooperate in good faith and, as necessary, seek 
the assistance of one or more competent international organizations in preventing 
significant transboundary harm or at any event in minimizing the risk thereof."78 
Other works by the Commission may also be relevant. 
3.2. Precedent 
The Trail Smelter arbitration79 decision is generally considered to be the lead case 
in the area of State liability for transboundary pollution. The dispute resulted from 
injuries caused in the U.S. state of Washington from sulfur dioxide discharged by 
a smelter plant in British Columbia, Canada, in the 1930S. Following diplomatic 
protests by the United States, the two countries agreed to submit the matter to arbi-
tration. In its decision, the arbitrator proclaimed a general principle of international 
law that would be very helpful to establishing State liability for greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Citing a well-known treatise of the day,8o the arbitrator stated that "[a] State 
owes at all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals 
from within its jurisdiction,"81 and later in the decision he went on to add that 
[n]o state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as 
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequences and the injury is established by 
clear and convincing evidence. 82 
State actions in more recent and well-known cases would not be as helpful in 
demonstrating the pervasive present-day acceptance of a principle of State liability 
for transboundary pollution. Most important is the Chernobyl nuclear accident, 
where the Ukraine refused to acknowledge liability and, in fact, the international 
community paid for the costs of decommissioning the reactors.83 Also unhelpful is 
the Sandoz Chemical Fire case, which involved a fire at a Sandoz corporation ware-
house in Switzerland. The fire resulted in thousands of cubic meters of chemically 
contaminated water seeping into the Rhine and constituted one of the worst environ-
mental disasters ever in Western Europe. None of the States affected brought claims 
against Switzerland.84 Finally, in the 1997-1998 Asian Haze case, a thick smoky haze 
caused by fires used to clear forests in the Indonesian provinces of Kalimantan and 
78 ld. 
79 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (Mar. ll, 1941). 
80 Clyde Eagleton, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1928). 
81 Trail Smelter, supra note 79 at 79. 
82 ld. at 90 . 
8) See Margaret Cocker, Chemobyl's NO.4 Reactor Remains Crumbling Threat, Mismanagement Snarls 
the Multibillion-Dollar Cleanup Effort in Ukraine, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 23, 2000 (discussing the 
Ukraine's use of the disaster as leverage to get increased foreign aid); see also A JOINT REPORT OF THE 
OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL 
NUCLEAR LAw IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD (2006). 
84 See Sandoz to Pay Rhine Pollution Claims, Swiss Chemical Company to Reimburse Claimants, FIN. 
TIMES UK, Nov. 14, 1986. 
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Sumatra spread across Southeast Asia. Despite the costly disruption of air travel and 
other business activities and significant adverse health and environmental effects, 
neighboring Southeast Asian countries did not make official diplomatic claims to the 
effect that Indonesia should be held legally responsible for the costs of the problem.85 
All of these cases may be distinguished from global warming by their unique 
facts. The Ukraine, for example, was poor and unable to well afford the cost of 
decommissioning the reactor on its own.86 Sandoz privately provided compensation 
for individual victims of the disaster.87 Finally, Southeast Asian governments, in 
accordance with ASEAN diplomatic protocol, used diplomacy, rather than formal 
legal claims, to encourage Indonesia to take action to avoid recurrence.88 The inter-
national environmental precedent relevant to a global warming case is, therefore, 
inconcl usive. 
. 3.3. Treaties and Soft Law Declarations 
Treaties are usually considered to be the most authoritative source of international 
law. The UNFCCC treaty standards prescribing state action related to global warm-
ing are likely to be the most generally applicable in a global warming suit because 
of States' almost universal participation in it, including by the United States. As 
discussed in Subsection 2.1.3, Article 4-2(a) of the UNFCCC specifically commits 
developed countries to limit their anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.89 
Other "principles" of the convention specified in Article 2 are likely to be important 
as well in interpreting this commitment. For example, Article 3(1) provides: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse effects thereof.90 
85 Instead, beginning in 1997, there has been joint ASEAN efforts at haze prevention pursuant to the 
Regional Haze Action Plan. In 2003, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 
entered in force. See ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, June 10, 2002, available 
at http://www.aseansec.org/pdf/agr_haze.pdf. The treaty provides for the use of zero burning and 
controlled-burning practices and for the deployment of a Panel of ASEAN Experts on Fire and Haze 
Assessment and Coordination. The problem, however, continues to persist. See Indonesia Downbeat 
on Stopping Fires Causing Haze, AsIAN ECON. NEWS, Dec. 11, 2006; see also Haze Online, Main Page, 
http://www.haze-online.or.id/(last visited Feb. 27, 2008). 
86 See sources supra note 83. 
87 See Sandoz to Pay Rhine Pollution Claims, supra note 84. 
88 See sources supra note 85. 
89 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
90 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art 3-1, May 9,1992,1771 U.N.T.S. Also 
helpful in supporting a climate change law suit would be Article 3.3, which provides: 
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
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The extensive state adherence to the UNFCCC is the result of the general per-
ception that the articles that I have referenced place no precisely definable legal 
limitations on states. Given that treaty's obligatory language regarding remediation 
of the global warming problem, particularly by developed countries, it is quite pos-
sible, however, that the ICJ would decide this not to be the case. 
Also discussed in Subsection 2.1.3, the Kyoto Protocol places obligations on devel-
oped countries to meet specific targets for reducing their contribution to global 
warming between 2008 and 2012.91 Because of the different ways in which the Kyoto 
obligations can be met,92 as well as that Protocol's more limited membership, its con-
tribution to the theory of a global warming case is likely to be much more complex. 
Other treaties also could possibly be relevant to constructing an international global 
warming suit. Among them is the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement examined by 
Wil Burns in this book, as well as the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution93 and certain of its protocols. This latter treaty regime regulates some pol-
lutants which affect global warming, and contains general language possibly helpful 
in a global warming suit. 
The two primary declarations relevant to liability for emissions of greenhouse gases 
are the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration. The Stockholm Declaration 
came out of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, often 
considered the progenitor of the modern environmental movement. It was adopted 
by a vote of 103 to 0 with 12 abstentions. Principle 21 of the Declaration is most 
apposite. It provides that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.94 
In 1992, twenty years after Stockholm, the second major global environmental 
conference, and one of the largest diplomatic gatherings in history, took place in Rio 
de Janeiro. It was the Earth Summit, officially called the United Nations Conference 
on the Environment and Development. One of the principal outcomes of this 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should 
be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such 
policies and measures should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be compre-
hensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs or greenhouse gases and adaptation, 
and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out by 
interested Parties. Id. at art. 3+ 
91 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra note 45. 
93 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, TIAS No. 10,541, reprinted 
in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979). 
94 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, princ. 21, Report of the United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc. NCONF.48h4fRev.l, 
U.N. Sales No. E.73-II.A.14, pt. 1, ch. 1 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). 
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conference was the Rio Declaration which was adopted by consensus. Principle 
2 of that declaration is identical to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
except that the words "and developmental" are inserted between "environmental" 
and "policies."95 Because the legal authority of declarations, and the relationship of 
treaties to each other and to other sources of international law, are not well settled 
within the international system, there are varied conceptual possibilities for how 
these legal instruments can be tailored into a coherent theory of a global warming 
case. 
4- CONCLUSION 
These are hopeful times in the short history of our efforts to remediate the global 
warming problem. For the first time, the issue seems to have penetrated deeply 
into the global mass political consciousness. Foundation money is flowing into 
climate change initiatives. It has become fashionable for celebrities and public 
personalities to associate themselves with the cause. Former Vice President Gore 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change won the 2007 Noble Peace 
Prize for their work on global warming. Venture capital and other forms of financing 
are flowing into researching and developing alternatives to greenhouse gas-emitting 
technologies. The Obama administration's commitment to climate and energy issues 
appears to be ushering in a new era of U.S. efforts. 
Yet there is reason to be sober in our assessment. Most climate scientists agree 
that greenhouse gas reduction targets currently being proposed are not sufficient 
to avert potentially cataclysmic effects. What's more, viewing the present concern 
from an historical perspective gives another reason for pause. We have seen before 
a pattern of great environmental awakening only to be followed by mass political 
denial. Building upon the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962, the 
modern environmental movement was born of an emerging consciousness that we 
share one small finite planet. After a sustained period of growing awareness and 
action, however, environmental matters largely went out of fashion in the 1980s. 
Then, heralded by Time magazine's choice of "endangered earth" as its "Planet of 
the Year" for 1989, and fueled by the end of the Cold War in the 1990S, concern 
for the environment again resurfaced in the popular consciousness. But this was 
once more followed by a decline in interest, especially after the terror attacks of 
September ll, 2001.96 
95 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Aug. 12, '992, U.N. Doc. NCONF.15'/5!REV., 
(1992), 3' I.L.M. 876. 
96 For a discussion of changing environmental attitudes in the United States specifically and the method-
ology of measuring them, see Chapter 3, Stability: Have Environmental Attitudes Changed over Time? 
in DEBORAH LYNN GUBER, THE GRASSROOTS OF A GREEN REVOLUTION (2003); see also TOM W. SMITH, 
TRENDS IN NATIONAL SPENDING PRIORITIES, 1973-2006, 23 (2007) (documenting results of U.S. public 
opinion polls demonstrating that support for environmental spending rose at the immediate end of 
the cold war and fell after the terror attacks of 2001). For a discussion of attitudes in the United States 
regarding global warming specifically, see Matthew C. Nisbet & Teresa Myers, Twenty Years of Public 
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Whatever political vagaries influence attempts to counteract global warming, 
there is likely a constructive role for litigation in general and perhaps for the IeJ 
in particular. But any such role needs to be seen as complementary to a broader 
political strategy. For example, the trust necessary for parties to succeed in good 
faith negotiations over global warming could well be undermined by certain parties 
initiating legal actions against others. On the other hand, as a spur to recalcitrant 
parties, litigation could have the benefits described in Section 1 of this chapter. 
We are still in the early stages of the global warming phenomenon. There likely 
will be different generations of lawsuits, probably evolving over time to deal less 
with the raising of political consciousness and more with the allocation oflosses and 
adaptation costs. Litigation is poised to playa role, and the ICJ with its unique status 
and visibility could make an important contribution. My hope in this chapter has 
been to further a discussion of how the door to that forum might be opened. 
Opinion About Global Wanning, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 13 (Fall 2007) (reporting on Gallup Poll results 
showing that between 1989 and 1991 about one-third of respondents worried "a great deal" about global 
warming with results fluctuating in the 1990S, falling after the 2001 terror attacks and now rebounding). 
